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The Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) deals with the cooperation/defection conflict between two agents.
The agents are represented by a cell of L × L square lattice. The agents are initially randomly
distributed according to a certain proportion ρc(0) of cooperators. Each agent does not have memory
of previous behaviors and plays the PD with eight nearest neighbors and then copies the behavior
of who had the greatest payoff for next generation. This system shows that, when the conflict is
established, cooperation among agents may emerge even for reasonably high defection temptation
values. Contrary to previous studies, which treat mean inter-group interaction, here a model where
the agents are not allowed to self-interact, representing intra-group interaction, is proposed. This
leads to short time and asymptotic behaviors similar to the one found when self-interaction is
considered. Nevertheless, the intermediate behavior is different, with no possible data collapse
since oscillations are present. Also, the fluctuations are much smaller in the intra-group model.
The geometrical configurations of cooperative clusters are distinct and explain the ρc(t) differences
between inter and intra-group models. The boundary conditions do not affect the results.
PACS numbers: 87.23.Ge, 87.23.Kg, 87.23.-n, 87.23.Cc, 05.90.+m, 87.90.+y, 89.90.+n, 02.50.-r, 02.50.Le,
02.50.Ng
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Although it has been always observed in natural sys-
tems, spontaneous cooperation has not a foothold within
the Darwinian Evolutionary theory, which frequently fo-
cuses to direct competition. No evolutionary modifica-
tion over a species can be selected by the natural se-
lection if the new trait is exclusively beneficial to other
species. Nevertheless, there can be indeed a selective
production of directly harmful structures to other ani-
mals, such as the viper’s hooks [1]. It may also be sug-
gested that Dawkins’ emphasis on selfish genes [2] comes
to give a new perspective on the role of competition since
it envisages even the possibility of competition inside the
genome. On the other hand, cooperation is favored in
group selection where although the detriment to the fit-
ness of individuals who, for instance, express a given
gene, it may be advantageous to the group (demes) which
the individuals are members [3].
The conflict between cooperation and competition
in the game theory, especially in the context of the
Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) problem, also known as “the
tragedy of the commons” [4] when defection dominates,
has been greatly investigated. Consider the following
rule [5]: two players can have payoff of either R = 1
(reward) or P = 0 (punishment), if both cooperate or
both defect, respectively. If one of them defect, the de-
fector has a payoff of T (temptation) and the cooperator
of S = 0 (sucker). The conflict is set up with cooperation
being the best global strategy and defection the best in-
dividual strategy, which occurs for [6]: T > R > P > S
and 2R > S + T . For the values employed here, with-
out any harm, the condition P > S has been relaxed
and the conflict range is: 1 < T < 2. Temptation is the
only free parameter in this model. If one assigns a state
θ = 0 (θ = 1) for defection (cooperation) [7], the payoff
of agent i, in state θi, given that agent j is in the state
θj , is: J(θi|θj) = θiθj + T (1− θiθj)θj .
A major advance in the comprehension of cooperation-
competition conflict has been made with the consid-
eration of one memory step for the agent when the
same agents play PD sucessively (Iterated Prisoner’s
Dilemma). The cooperation has first emerged in this
system as a component of an optimum strategy in ei-
ther with tit-for-tat in deterministic environment [6, 8]
[θi(t + 1) = θj(t), where t is the time step] or win-stay
lose-shift, also known as the Pavlov strategy, in stochas-
tic environment [9] {θi(t + 1) = θi(t) if J [θi(t)|θj(t)] ≥
J [θi(t− 1)|θj(t− 1)] or θi(t+ 1) = 1− θi(t), otherwise}.
Nowak and May [5, 10] considered the interaction
among several agents, who play PD repetitively, i.e., an
N -agent game. This analysis of the PD, including the
spatial component (SPD), has validated the argument
that cooperation could emerge as a stable strategy when
the dilemma is played among several agents dynamically.
This model is interesting when dealing with a whole con-
glomerate of individuals (group), each represented by a
cell of a square lattice [5]. This conglomerate can be
either in a cooperative or defective state and can play
the PD with itself, setting up an environment of inter-
acting groups - an inter-group model. We stress that
in this case self-interaction is well justified for sucessive
time steps in demes and that cooperation states may
emerge from group selection models as Refs. [11, 12] sug-
2α 9→ 8→ 7→ 6→ 5→ 4→ 3
m n 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
1 9/8 8/7 7/6 6/5 5/4 4/3 3/2
2 9/7 8/6 7/5 6/4 5/3 2
3 9/6 8/5 7/4 2
4 9/5 2
TABLE I: The Prisoner’s Dilemma transitions as a function of
neighborhood α are given by: Tn,m = (α−n)/(α−n−m) with
1 < T < 2, 0 ≤ n < α and 1 ≤ m ≤ int[(α− n− 1)/2]. [15]
est. Also, the SPD has been played on more realistic
structures, which mimic social relations, such as the small
world networks [13], disordered lattices [14] and random
graphs [15], increasing the scope of application of single
PD which ranges from gene polymorphism in yeast [16],
intra-host competition in RNA virus [17, 18] to predator
inspection in fishes [19, 20, 21].
In the SPD there exist three main regimes as a func-
tion of T , where temptation is not the only evolutionary
stable strategy [22]. For T ∼ 1 (T ∼ 2), the propor-
tion of cooperators ρc is stationary and majority (minor-
ity). For intermediate values of T , ρc is non-stationary
even presenting chaos [5]. However, each main regime
may be divided into regions where ρc(T ) change val-
ues according to the number of interacting neighbors α
and number of interacting cooperators 0 ≤ s ≤ α. If
agent i has si cooperative agents around, his/her pay-
off is [15]: g
(si)
θi
= [T − (T − 1)θi]si. This leads to:
g
(s)
1 = s and g
(s)
0 = Ts, since T > 1, g
(s)
0 > g
(s)
1
and g
(s)
θ ≥ g
(s−1)
θ . The transitions are given by [15]:
Tn,m = (α − n)/(α − n − m), since 1 < T < 2, then
0 ≤ n < α and 1 ≤ m ≤ int[(α− n− 1)/2]. These values
are shown in Table I. Also as pointed out by Schweitzer et
al. [7] and Dura´n and Mulet [15], it is interesting to view
the system as two populations that invade each other
instead of agents switching states as a function of time.
Nevertheless, if one considers an intra-group model,
where the lattice represents a group and the cells are
thought as individuals, one can hardly explain this self-
interaction as a viable social and biological behavior.
This increases the scope of application of the SPD in
sociophysics [23, 24] and agent-based models of econo-
physics [25, 26].
In this paper we compare the intra (α = 8) and inter-
group (α = 9) models. We show that self-interaction
produces a bias to cooperative states leadingto more sta-
ble cooperation clusters which increase fluctuations of
the cluster size modifying the dynamics of the system.
We start describing the model then extend the boundary
analysis to the cooperation cluster and finally we present
and interpret the results obtained by numerical simula-
tion.
Consider an initial randomly distributed proportion
ρc(0) of agents who cooperate in the L × L cells of a
square lattice. The initial distribution of collaborators
FIG. 1: Graphical representation of the asymptotic values
(1000 generations) of an initial proportion of cooperation
ρc(0) = 0.60 in 1000 clone groups of non-self-interacting
agents in square lattice (L = 200) as a function of tempta-
tion values using periodic boundary condition. This pattern
is consistent with the transition values with α = 8 in Table I.
The error bars refer to the standard error of the mean. In-
set: Amplification of the cooperation/defection coexistence
region.
is the only stochasticity considered and the evolution of
the system is entirely deterministic afterwards. At each
generation, each agent plays the PD with the first and
second neighbors totalizing α = 8. The given agent com-
pares his/her own payoff with the considered neighbor
ones and, for the next generation, copies the agent state θ
of whom had the highest payoff. The scores of the agents
are not cumulative; all the payoffs are reset to zero af-
ter each PD round (“one-shot game”). The case where
agents self-interact and interact with only the nearest
neighbors (α = 5) is treated in Ref. [7].
In the system where the agents self-interact (α = 9),
the cooperation/defection coexistence region is in the in-
terval 9/5 < T < 2. For not self-interacting agents
(α = 8), this region is: 8/5 < T < 5/3 (see Fig. 1 and
Table I). Notice that contrary to inter-group model, the
defection regime is present near the middle of the con-
flict region (1 < T < 2). Neglecting self-interaction does
not drastically change none of the two regimes (station-
ary, non-stationary) nor the pattern found by Nowak &
May [5], but only shifts them to lower temptation values.
To understand the dynamics and to quantify payoffs,
let us first classify the agents according to the posi-
tion of the cell in the L × L square lattice. There are:
(L − 2)2 of inner (bulk) agents who have 4 first neigh-
bors and 4 second neighbors (αb = 8); 4(L−2) of surface
agents who have 3 first neighbors and 2 second neigh-
bors (αs = 5) and 4(L − 2) of edge agents have 2 first
neighbors and 1 second neighbor (αe = 3). As the or-
der of adjacency is decreased, the number of first neigh-
3bors decrease arithmetically while the number of sec-
ond neighbors is halved (geometrically). Considering the
variables Iext = 4(L − 1), Iint = 2(L − 1)(L − 2) and
Icross = 2(L−1)
2 and adding them, one obtains the num-
ber of times the PD is played in each generation for fixed
boundary condition (FBC) Nf = Iext + Iint + Icross =
4 (L−1) (L−1/2), and for periodic boundary conditions
(PBC) Np = 2[2(L− 1)(L− 1/2)+L+1] = Nf +2L+2.
This quantifies the effect of the PBC on the group. For
L ≫ 1, Np ≃ Nf ≃ 4L
2, the remaining difference be-
tween PBC and FBC being of order L.
The boundary effect of cooperative cluster agents pro-
vides some understanding about the dynamics of the sys-
tem. The idea of cooperation adjacency reveals several
scenarios going from the bulk agents, who have payoff 8
units (due to 8 cooperative agents around), surface agents
with payoff 5 and convex edge agents with payoff 3 while
the payoff of the surrounding defector agents are T . The
convex edge agents are the more unstable ones. Edge
agents can be either convex, if the agent have 2 nearest
and 1 next-nearest cooperators or concave, if the agent
have 4 nearest and 3 next-nearest cooperators.
The deterministic dynamics forbids inner (bulk) agents
to switch state if all the nearest and next-nearest neigh-
bors have the same state (bulk cell of a cooperative clus-
ter, for instance). The cooperative cluster conformations
start to be altered in the convex edge cells, because of
the smallest payoff leading them to switch state and pro-
ducing new edge cells which, again are more susceptible
to switch state and permit the cooperation cluster to be
invaded. As illustrated in Fig. 2, cooperation clusters
evolve differently when self-interaction is considered or
not. If self-interaction is considered, the cooperative clus-
ters are essentially squares, which have 4 convex edges.
On the other hand, when self-interaction is neglected,
the cooperation clusters are essentially spherical, having
more convex edges which diminishes the cluster stability.
In Fig. 2, in order to have around the same cooperation
cluster density, it is necessary to have smaller temptation
values T when self-interaction is neglected.
A comparison between the evolution of cooperators
proportion ρc(t), with and without self-interaction as a
function of time (generations) t, is shown in Fig. 3 for
fixed and periodic boundaries conditions. Starting with
ρc(0) = 0.60, both systems react in the first generation
by lowering ρc(t) and then increasing it by the forma-
tion of cooperation clusters. The seed to form a coop-
eration cluster is when four nearest neighbors cells are
in a cooperative state. This increase of ρc(t) occurs up
to around ten generations for both models. We point
out that ρ
(si)
c (t) ∼ 5ρ
(nsi)
c (t), for 1 ≤ t ≤ 10. The in-
termediate regime is the most interesting one since the
differences between the inter and intra-group models are
striking, while ρ
(si)
c (t) is smooth, ρ
(nsi)
c (t) oscillates. Fi-
nally, after about 100 generations both systems stabilize
and the proportion of cooperation is ρ
(si)
c (∞) = 0.318
and ρ
(nsi)
c (∞) = 0.299. These values are very close but
FIG. 2: One realization of cooperator and defectors with
Tnsi = 1.65 and Tsi = 1.95 when self-interaction is neglected
(a) and considered (b), as t → ∞, with periodic boundary
condition. The initial values are ρc(0) = 0.60 for a square
lattice of size L = 200. The following color coding has been
used: blue (dark gray), the agent is a cooperator; green (light
gray), the agent is a former defector; red (gray), the agent
is a defector; yellow (very light gray), the agent is a former
cooperator. Without self-interaction (top) cooperative clus-
ters grow as a round-shaped forms while with self-interaction
(bottom) these clusters grow as square-shaped forms.
they are significantly distinct, once they persist indefi-
nitely as stationary values (see inset of Fig. 3). The error
bars, which are the standard error of the mean, are one
order of magnitude smaller for the intra-group model.
In the intermediate regime, from 10 up to 100 gen-
erations, ρ
(si)
c (t) grows rapidly presenting a great bump
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FIG. 3: Proportion of cooperators ρc as a function of time t for
Tsi = 1.95 and Tnsi = 1.65 for inter (below) and intra-group
(above) with fixed (line) and periodic (dotted line) boundary
conditions. The initial values are ρc(0) = 0.60 for a L = 200
lattice and M = 1000 realizations. Inset: Same but with
200 < t < 1000. The fluctuations are much smaller in the
inter-group model.
(t ∼ 25) before stabilization. On the other hand, ρ
(nsi)
c (t)
grows less rapidly and presents smaller, but more fre-
quent, bumps (oscillatory behavior). The reason for
these different behaviors can be understood with the con-
sideration of geometrical structures of the cooperation
clusters, which implies in different cooperating cluster
stabilities. As we have seen, these clusters are square-
like and circle-like when self-interaction is considered or
neglected, respectively, with the former one being more
stable than the latter.
When agents self-interact, the initial cooperative clus-
ters grow, increasing ρ
(si)
c (t) until they crash with each
other (and/or touch the boundaries for FCB case) pro-
ducing numerous less stable cooperation clusters. This
crash generates the great bump (Fig. 3) and may pro-
duce larger fluctuation when compared to the intra-group
model (see inset of Fig. 3). When the agents do not self-
interact, the clusters growing behavior is different, be-
cause they are rounded, having more convex edge cells,
so that the clusters grow until they reach a critical size
and then break in parts which are the seeds for new co-
operation clusters. These clusters have a notable abil-
ity to self-disperse in more homogeneous smaller grow-
ing islands. This mechanism produces the transient os-
cillations and smaller fluctuations observed (see inset of
Fig. 3) found for the inter-group model.
We have considered (inter group) and neglected (intra
group) the self-interaction of agents in the spatial DP
game. For short and long times, both models present
about the same average behavior. Nevertheless, the fluc-
tuations for intergroup are greater (one order of magni-
tude) for the intragroup case. In the intermediate regime
they drastically differ due to the geometrical shape of
the cooperation cluster which are typically square-like for
inter group and circle-like for intra-group models. The
overall effect of self-interaction is to favor cooperation in
all steps of evolution and increase fluctuation due to the
more stability of the cooperation clusters.
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